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pyMC_Repeater/docs/pr_hash_once.md
T
TJ Downes 4e16fd040d perf: compute packet hash once per packet in the forwarding hot path
Before this change, calculate_packet_hash() (SHA-256 + hex + upper) was called
3 times per forwarded packet and 4 times per dropped packet:
  __call__              → pkt_hash_full = packet.calculate_packet_hash()   #1
  → flood/direct_forward → is_duplicate → calculate_packet_hash()          #2
  → flood/direct_forward → mark_seen    → calculate_packet_hash()          #3
  (drop) → _get_drop_reason → is_duplicate → calculate_packet_hash()       #4

pkt_hash_full was computed in __call__ but never threaded down into
process_packet, flood_forward, direct_forward, is_duplicate, or _get_drop_reason.
Each method recomputed it independently.

Fix: add optional packet_hash: Optional[str] = None to is_duplicate,
_get_drop_reason, flood_forward, direct_forward, and process_packet.  Pass
pkt_hash_full from __call__ through the chain.  Each method uses the provided
hash or falls back to computing it — preserving backward compatibility for
external callers (TraceHelper, etc.) that have no pre-computed hash.

Result: 1 SHA-256 computation per packet in the hot path regardless of whether
the packet is forwarded or dropped.

Also adds explicit INVARIANT docstrings to flood_forward, direct_forward, and
is_duplicate documenting that these methods must remain synchronous (no await).
The is_duplicate + mark_seen pair is atomic within the asyncio event loop; adding
an await between them would allow two concurrent tasks to both pass the duplicate
check for the same packet — forwarding it twice.

Docs: docs/pr_hash_once.md — problem analysis, call-chain diagram, per-method
diffs, quantification (~3-8 µs saved per packet), test plan (including hash-count
assertion), and proof that passing the original's hash to the deep-copied packet
is correct.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-21 19:28:45 -07:00

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# PR: Compute Packet Hash Once Per Forwarded Packet
**Branch:** `perf/hash-once`
**Base:** `rightup/fix-perfom-speed`
**Files changed:** `repeater/engine.py` (1 file, ~51 lines net)
---
## Problem
`packet.calculate_packet_hash()` runs a SHA-256 digest over the full serialised
packet bytes, converts the result to a hex string, and uppercases it. Before
this change the hot forwarding path triggered this computation **three times per
packet**:
| Call site | Where | When |
|-----------|-------|------|
| `__call__` line 162 | `pkt_hash_full = packet.calculate_packet_hash()...` | Every received packet |
| `flood_forward` / `direct_forward` via `is_duplicate` | `pkt_hash = packet.calculate_packet_hash()...` | Every packet that reaches the forward check |
| `flood_forward` / `direct_forward` via `mark_seen` | `pkt_hash = packet_hash or packet.calculate_packet_hash()...` | Every packet that passes the duplicate check |
And on the drop path, a fourth computation:
| Call site | Where | When |
|-----------|-------|------|
| `_get_drop_reason``is_duplicate` | `pkt_hash = packet.calculate_packet_hash()...` | Every dropped packet |
The hash computed in `__call__` was already available as `pkt_hash_full` but was
never passed into `process_packet`, `flood_forward`, `direct_forward`,
`is_duplicate`, `mark_seen`, or `_get_drop_reason`. Each of those methods
recomputed it independently.
---
## Root Cause
The `packet_hash` optional parameter existed on `mark_seen` but not on
`is_duplicate`, `flood_forward`, `direct_forward`, `process_packet`, or
`_get_drop_reason`. The call chain therefore had no way to propagate the
already-computed hash.
---
## Solution
Thread the pre-computed `pkt_hash_full` from `__call__` down through the call
chain as an optional `packet_hash: Optional[str] = None` parameter. Each method
uses the provided hash if present, or falls back to computing it — preserving
backward compatibility for any caller that doesn't have a pre-computed hash.
```
Before:
__call__ → calculate_packet_hash() #1
→ process_packet
→ flood_forward
→ is_duplicate → calculate_packet_hash() #2
→ mark_seen → calculate_packet_hash() #3
(drop path)
→ _get_drop_reason
→ is_duplicate → calculate_packet_hash() #4
After:
__call__ → calculate_packet_hash() #1 (only computation)
→ process_packet(packet_hash=pkt_hash_full)
→ flood_forward(packet_hash=pkt_hash_full)
→ is_duplicate(packet_hash=pkt_hash_full) uses provided hash ✓
→ mark_seen(packet_hash=pkt_hash_full) uses provided hash ✓
(drop path)
→ _get_drop_reason(packet_hash=pkt_hash_full)
→ is_duplicate(packet_hash=pkt_hash_full) uses provided hash ✓
```
---
## Methods Changed
### `is_duplicate(packet, packet_hash=None)`
```python
# Before
def is_duplicate(self, packet: Packet) -> bool:
pkt_hash = packet.calculate_packet_hash().hex().upper() # always recomputed
if pkt_hash in self.seen_packets:
return True
return False
# After
def is_duplicate(self, packet: Packet, packet_hash: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
"""...
INVARIANT: purely synchronous — no await points. The caller relies on
is_duplicate + mark_seen being atomic within the asyncio event loop.
Do NOT add any await here without revisiting that invariant.
"""
pkt_hash = packet_hash or packet.calculate_packet_hash().hex().upper()
return pkt_hash in self.seen_packets
```
### `_get_drop_reason(packet, packet_hash=None)`
```python
# Before
def _get_drop_reason(self, packet: Packet) -> str:
if self.is_duplicate(packet): ... # recomputes hash
# After
def _get_drop_reason(self, packet: Packet, packet_hash: Optional[str] = None) -> str:
if self.is_duplicate(packet, packet_hash=packet_hash): ... # propagates hash
```
### `flood_forward(packet, packet_hash=None)`
```python
# Before
def flood_forward(self, packet: Packet) -> Optional[Packet]:
...
if self.is_duplicate(packet): ... # recomputes
self.mark_seen(packet) # recomputes
# After
def flood_forward(self, packet: Packet, packet_hash: Optional[str] = None) -> Optional[Packet]:
"""...
INVARIANT: purely synchronous — no await points.
"""
...
if self.is_duplicate(packet, packet_hash=packet_hash): ... # propagates
self.mark_seen(packet, packet_hash=packet_hash) # propagates
```
### `direct_forward(packet, packet_hash=None)` — same pattern as `flood_forward`
### `process_packet(packet, snr=0.0, packet_hash=None)`
```python
# Before
def process_packet(self, packet, snr=0.0):
fwd_pkt = self.flood_forward(packet) # no hash
# After
def process_packet(self, packet, snr=0.0, packet_hash=None):
"""...
packet_hash: pre-computed SHA-256 hex from __call__; eliminates 2 SHA-256
calls per forwarded packet by propagating the hash through the call chain.
"""
fwd_pkt = self.flood_forward(packet, packet_hash=packet_hash)
```
### `__call__` — two call-site changes
```python
# Before
result = (None if ... else self.process_packet(processed_packet, snr))
...
drop_reason = processed_packet.drop_reason or self._get_drop_reason(processed_packet)
# After
result = (None if ... else self.process_packet(processed_packet, snr, packet_hash=pkt_hash_full))
...
drop_reason = processed_packet.drop_reason or self._get_drop_reason(
processed_packet, packet_hash=pkt_hash_full
)
```
---
## What Was Not Changed
`record_packet_only` (line 446) and `record_duplicate` (line 486) each compute
the hash independently. These are separate recording paths (called from the
inject path and from the raw-packet subscriber, respectively) that have no
`pkt_hash_full` from `__call__` in scope. Changing them would require a larger
refactor with no benefit to the forwarding hot path, so they are left unchanged.
The fallback `packet_hash or packet.calculate_packet_hash()...` pattern in
`is_duplicate`, `mark_seen`, and `_build_packet_record` ensures external callers
(e.g. `TraceHelper.is_duplicate(packet)` from trace processing) continue to work
without any change.
---
## Invariant Comments Added
`flood_forward`, `direct_forward`, and `is_duplicate` now carry explicit docstring
invariants:
> **INVARIANT:** purely synchronous — no await points. The is_duplicate +
> mark_seen pair is atomic within the asyncio event loop. Do NOT add any await
> here without revisiting that invariant in `__call__` / `process_packet`.
These invariants were implicit before. Making them explicit means a future
contributor adding an `await` inside these methods will see the warning and
understand the consequence: the duplicate-check and mark-seen can no longer be
guaranteed atomic, allowing the same packet to be forwarded twice under concurrent
task dispatch.
---
## Quantification
On a Raspberry Pi running CPython 3.13, `hashlib.sha256` on a 50200 byte
LoRa payload takes approximately 13 µs. The `.hex().upper()` string conversion
adds another ~0.5 µs. Savings per forwarded packet: ~38 µs.
At 3 packets/second sustained forwarding rate this saves ~1025 µs/second, which
is negligible in absolute terms. The more significant benefit is correctness and
clarity:
- One canonical hash value per packet in the forwarding path.
- No possibility of the hash changing between the `is_duplicate` check and the
`mark_seen` call if `calculate_packet_hash` had any mutable state (it doesn't,
but the pattern is now provably correct).
- Explicit invariant documentation closes a latent trap for future contributors.
---
## Test Plan
### Unit tests (no hardware)
**T1 — Hash computed exactly once per forwarded packet**
```python
async def test_hash_computed_once_for_flood():
call_count = 0
original = Packet.calculate_packet_hash
def counting_hash(self):
nonlocal call_count
call_count += 1
return original(self)
with patch.object(Packet, "calculate_packet_hash", counting_hash):
await engine(flood_packet, metadata={})
assert call_count == 1, f"Expected 1 hash computation, got {call_count}"
```
**T2 — Hash computed exactly once per dropped (duplicate) packet**
```python
async def test_hash_computed_once_for_duplicate():
# Mark packet seen first
engine.seen_packets[packet.calculate_packet_hash().hex().upper()] = time.time()
call_count = 0
original = Packet.calculate_packet_hash
def counting_hash(self):
nonlocal call_count; call_count += 1; return original(self)
with patch.object(Packet, "calculate_packet_hash", counting_hash):
await engine(packet, metadata={})
# One computation in __call__ for pkt_hash_full; should not trigger again
# in process_packet → flood_forward → is_duplicate (drop path via _get_drop_reason)
assert call_count == 1
```
**T3 — External callers of `is_duplicate` without hash still work**
```python
def test_is_duplicate_without_hash():
"""TraceHelper and other external callers pass no hash — must still work."""
pkt = make_test_packet()
engine.seen_packets[pkt.calculate_packet_hash().hex().upper()] = time.time()
assert engine.is_duplicate(pkt) is True # no packet_hash arg
assert engine.is_duplicate(pkt, packet_hash="WRONGHASH") is False
```
**T4 — mark_seen / is_duplicate agree on the same hash**
```python
def test_mark_then_is_duplicate_consistent():
pkt = make_test_packet()
pkt_hash = pkt.calculate_packet_hash().hex().upper()
assert engine.is_duplicate(pkt, packet_hash=pkt_hash) is False
engine.mark_seen(pkt, packet_hash=pkt_hash)
assert engine.is_duplicate(pkt, packet_hash=pkt_hash) is True
# Same result without the pre-computed hash (fallback path)
assert engine.is_duplicate(pkt) is True
```
**T5 — flood_forward / direct_forward signatures are backward compatible**
```python
def test_flood_forward_no_hash_arg():
"""Callers that don't pass packet_hash must still work (fallback compute)."""
pkt = make_flood_packet()
result = engine.flood_forward(pkt) # no packet_hash — must not raise
assert result is not None or pkt.drop_reason is not None
```
### Integration / field tests (with hardware)
**T6 — Forwarding throughput unchanged**
1. Forward 100 packets at maximum duty-cycle budget.
2. Verify all eligible packets are forwarded (same count as before change).
3. Verify no `Duplicate` drops that were not present before.
**T7 — Duplicate detection unchanged**
1. Send the same packet twice within 1 second.
2. Verify the first is forwarded and the second is logged as `"Duplicate"`.
**T8 — CPU profile shows reduced `calculate_packet_hash` calls**
1. Enable Python profiling (`cProfile`) on the repeater for 60 seconds.
2. Compare `calculate_packet_hash` call count before and after.
**Expected:** call count approximately halved for workloads where most packets
are forwarded (≤ 1 call per forwarded packet vs ≥ 3 before).
---
## Proof of Correctness
### Why the fallback `packet_hash or packet.calculate_packet_hash()` is safe
`packet_hash` is either the correct hash (passed from `__call__`) or `None`.
If it is `None`, the fallback computes the hash fresh — identical to the old
behaviour. There is no case where a wrong hash is used: the only source of a
non-None `packet_hash` is `pkt_hash_full = packet.calculate_packet_hash()...`
in `__call__`, computed over the same `processed_packet` (a deep copy of the
received packet, unchanged between hash computation and the call to
`process_packet`).
### Why passing the hash through a deep-copied packet is correct
`processed_packet = copy.deepcopy(packet)` (line 178) happens before
`pkt_hash_full` is passed to `process_packet`. The deep copy does not change
the packet's wire representation — `calculate_packet_hash()` calls
`packet.write_to()` which serialises the packet's fields. The copy has the
same fields, so `deepcopy(packet).calculate_packet_hash() == packet.calculate_packet_hash()`.
Passing the hash computed from the original to the copy is correct.
### Why the invariant is critical
asyncio only yields execution at `await` points. `flood_forward` and
`direct_forward` have no `await`, so they run atomically from the event loop's
perspective. The `is_duplicate` check and the `mark_seen` call inside them
cannot be interleaved with another coroutine. If a future change added an
`await` between them, two concurrent `_route_packet` tasks could both pass the
duplicate check for the same packet before either marked it seen — sending the
same packet twice. The invariant comment documents this so the risk is visible
at the point where it could be broken.