Add more aggressive packet validity checking. Closes #315.

This commit is contained in:
Jack Kingsman
2026-07-08 15:16:21 -07:00
parent 84e6c34255
commit f45b84b15c
4 changed files with 194 additions and 7 deletions
+52
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@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ from enum import IntEnum
import nacl.bindings
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from nacl.exceptions import BadSignatureError
from nacl.signing import VerifyKey
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -377,6 +379,56 @@ def parse_advertisement(
)
# Advertisement layout constants, mirroring firmware MeshCore.h / Mesh.cpp.
# pub_key(32) || timestamp(4) || signature(64) || app_data(<= MAX_ADVERT_DATA_SIZE)
_ADVERT_PUB_KEY_SIZE = 32
_ADVERT_TIMESTAMP_SIZE = 4
_ADVERT_SIGNATURE_SIZE = 64
_ADVERT_MAX_APP_DATA_SIZE = 32 # firmware MAX_ADVERT_DATA_SIZE
_ADVERT_HEADER_SIZE = _ADVERT_PUB_KEY_SIZE + _ADVERT_TIMESTAMP_SIZE + _ADVERT_SIGNATURE_SIZE # 100
def verify_advert_signature(payload: bytes) -> bool:
"""Verify a MeshCore advertisement's Ed25519 signature.
Mirrors the firmware check in ``Mesh.cpp`` ``onRecvPacket()`` for
``PAYLOAD_TYPE_ADVERT``: the signed message is
``pub_key(32) || timestamp(4) || app_data``, where ``app_data`` is
everything following the 64-byte signature, clamped to
``MAX_ADVERT_DATA_SIZE`` (32) bytes. The signature is verified against the
public key embedded in the advert itself, so a bit-flip in the key, the
signed body, or the signature all cause rejection.
``payload`` must be the advert payload starting at the public key (i.e.
``PacketInfo.payload`` for an ADVERT packet). Returns ``True`` only when the
signature is valid; any malformed input or verification failure returns
``False`` so callers fail closed and never ingest a forged advert.
"""
if len(payload) < _ADVERT_HEADER_SIZE:
return False
public_key = payload[0:_ADVERT_PUB_KEY_SIZE]
signature = payload[_ADVERT_PUB_KEY_SIZE + _ADVERT_TIMESTAMP_SIZE : _ADVERT_HEADER_SIZE]
app_data_len = min(len(payload) - _ADVERT_HEADER_SIZE, _ADVERT_MAX_APP_DATA_SIZE)
# pub_key || timestamp is the contiguous slice payload[0:36]; append app_data.
message = (
payload[0 : _ADVERT_PUB_KEY_SIZE + _ADVERT_TIMESTAMP_SIZE]
+ payload[_ADVERT_HEADER_SIZE : _ADVERT_HEADER_SIZE + app_data_len]
)
try:
VerifyKey(public_key).verify(message, signature)
return True
except BadSignatureError:
return False
except Exception:
# Malformed/non-canonical public key or other unexpected failure — treat
# as invalid rather than propagating into the packet pipeline.
logger.warning("Advert signature verification errored; treating as invalid", exc_info=True)
return False
# =============================================================================
# Direct Message (TEXT_MESSAGE) Decryption
# =============================================================================
+15
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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ from app.decoder import (
try_decrypt_dm,
try_decrypt_packet_with_channel_key,
try_decrypt_path,
verify_advert_signature,
)
from app.keystore import get_private_key, get_public_key, has_private_key
from app.models import (
@@ -533,6 +534,20 @@ async def _process_advertisement(
logger.debug("Failed to parse advertisement payload")
return
# Reject adverts whose Ed25519 signature does not verify against the embedded
# public key. MeshCore firmware (Mesh.cpp onRecvPacket) drops forged/corrupted
# adverts at exactly this check; without it a bit-flipped advert would be
# ingested as a phantom contact with a mangled public key (issue #315). The raw
# packet is already stored (see process_raw_packet) and still surfaces in the
# debug feed — only contact creation/update is gated here, matching firmware.
if not verify_advert_signature(packet_info.payload):
logger.warning(
"Dropping advertisement with invalid signature from %s (packet %s)",
advert.public_key[:12],
raw_bytes.hex().upper(),
)
return
new_path_len = packet_info.path_length
new_path_hex = packet_info.path.hex() if packet_info.path else ""
+60
View File
@@ -675,6 +675,66 @@ class TestAdvertisementParsing:
assert result is None
class TestVerifyAdvertSignature:
"""Ed25519 advertisement signature verification (mirrors firmware Mesh.cpp).
Uses a real captured advert as the golden compatibility vector: it was signed
by a genuine MeshCore device and accepted by firmware, so our verifier must
accept it. Corrupting any signed region (pubkey, body, or signature) must be
rejected this is the phantom-contact bug in issue #315.
"""
# Real advert packet (name decodes to "Lightless" + emoji), same vector used
# by test_parse_advertisement_extracts_public_key above.
REAL_ADVERT_PACKET = bytes.fromhex(
"1100AE92564C5C9884854F04F469BBB2BAB8871A078053AF6CF4AA2C014B18CE8A83"
"2DBF6669128E9476F36320F21D1B37FF1CF31680F50F4B17EDABCC7CF8C47D3C5E1D"
"F3AFD0C8721EA06A8078462EF241DEF80AD6922751F206E3BB121DFB604F4146D60D"
"913628D902602DB5F8466C696768746C657373F09FA59D"
)
def _payload(self) -> bytes:
from app.decoder import parse_packet
info = parse_packet(self.REAL_ADVERT_PACKET)
assert info is not None
return info.payload
def test_accepts_real_advert(self):
from app.decoder import verify_advert_signature
assert verify_advert_signature(self._payload()) is True
def test_rejects_corrupted_public_key(self):
from app.decoder import verify_advert_signature
payload = bytearray(self._payload())
payload[5] ^= 0x01 # flip a bit in the public key (bytes 0-31)
assert verify_advert_signature(bytes(payload)) is False
def test_rejects_corrupted_signed_body(self):
from app.decoder import verify_advert_signature
payload = bytearray(self._payload())
payload[110] ^= 0x01 # flip a bit in the app-data (after the signature)
assert verify_advert_signature(bytes(payload)) is False
def test_rejects_corrupted_signature(self):
from app.decoder import verify_advert_signature
payload = bytearray(self._payload())
payload[40] ^= 0x01 # flip a bit inside the 64-byte signature (bytes 36-99)
assert verify_advert_signature(bytes(payload)) is False
def test_rejects_truncated_payload(self):
from app.decoder import verify_advert_signature
# Anything shorter than pubkey(32)+timestamp(4)+signature(64)=100 bytes
# cannot be verified and must fail closed.
assert verify_advert_signature(b"") is False
assert verify_advert_signature(self._payload()[:99]) is False
class TestPublicKeyDerivation:
"""Test deriving Ed25519 public key from MeshCore private key."""
+67 -7
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@@ -369,7 +369,10 @@ class TestAdvertisementPipeline:
short_packet_info.payload = b""
with patch("app.packet_processor.broadcast_event", mock_broadcast):
with patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse:
with (
patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse,
patch("app.packet_processor.verify_advert_signature", return_value=True),
):
mock_parse.return_value = ParsedAdvertisement(
public_key=test_pubkey,
name="TestNode",
@@ -387,7 +390,10 @@ class TestAdvertisementPipeline:
long_packet_info.payload = b""
with patch("app.packet_processor.broadcast_event", mock_broadcast):
with patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse:
with (
patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse,
patch("app.packet_processor.verify_advert_signature", return_value=True),
):
mock_parse.return_value = ParsedAdvertisement(
public_key=test_pubkey,
name="TestNode",
@@ -439,7 +445,10 @@ class TestAdvertisementPipeline:
skewed_shorter_packet_info.payload = b""
with patch("app.packet_processor.broadcast_event", mock_broadcast):
with patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse:
with (
patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse,
patch("app.packet_processor.verify_advert_signature", return_value=True),
):
mock_parse.return_value = ParsedAdvertisement(
public_key=test_pubkey,
name="TestNode",
@@ -453,7 +462,10 @@ class TestAdvertisementPipeline:
)
with patch("app.packet_processor.broadcast_event", mock_broadcast):
with patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse:
with (
patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse,
patch("app.packet_processor.verify_advert_signature", return_value=True),
):
mock_parse.return_value = ParsedAdvertisement(
public_key=test_pubkey,
name="TestNode",
@@ -501,7 +513,10 @@ class TestAdvertisementPipeline:
packet_info.path_hash_size = 1
with patch("app.packet_processor.broadcast_event", mock_broadcast):
with patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse:
with (
patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse,
patch("app.packet_processor.verify_advert_signature", return_value=True),
):
mock_parse.return_value = ParsedAdvertisement(
public_key=test_pubkey,
name="TestNode",
@@ -552,7 +567,10 @@ class TestAdvertisementPipeline:
long_packet_info.payload = b""
with patch("app.packet_processor.broadcast_event", mock_broadcast):
with patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse:
with (
patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement") as mock_parse,
patch("app.packet_processor.verify_advert_signature", return_value=True),
):
mock_parse.return_value = ParsedAdvertisement(
public_key=test_pubkey,
name="TestNode",
@@ -572,6 +590,45 @@ class TestAdvertisementPipeline:
("aa", 1),
]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_advertisement_with_forged_signature_creates_no_contact(
self, test_db, captured_broadcasts
):
"""A corrupted/forged advert must not be ingested as a phantom contact (#315).
The raw packet is still stored (so the debug feed sees it), but no contact
row is created and no `contact` event is broadcast mirroring firmware,
which drops adverts that fail signature verification.
"""
from app.decoder import parse_packet
from app.packet_processor import process_raw_packet
fixture = FIXTURES["advertisement_chat_node"]
packet_bytes = bytearray(bytes.fromhex(fixture["raw_packet_hex"]))
expected_pubkey = fixture["expected_ws_event"]["data"]["public_key"]
# Flip a bit inside the public key (payload byte 5) to simulate an
# over-the-air corrupted advert. Parsing still succeeds structurally, but
# the signature no longer matches the (now-mangled) key.
payload_start = len(packet_bytes) - len(parse_packet(bytes(packet_bytes)).payload)
packet_bytes[payload_start + 5] ^= 0x01
broadcasts, mock_broadcast = captured_broadcasts
with patch("app.packet_processor.broadcast_event", mock_broadcast):
result = await process_raw_packet(bytes(packet_bytes), timestamp=1700000000)
# No contact created — neither under the original key nor the mangled one.
assert await ContactRepository.get_by_key_prefix(expected_pubkey[:12]) is None
all_contacts = await ContactRepository.get_all()
assert all_contacts == []
# No contact broadcast emitted.
assert [b for b in broadcasts if b["type"] == "contact"] == []
# The raw packet is still stored for the debug feed.
assert result["packet_id"] is not None
class TestPathPacketPipeline:
"""Test PATH packet learning and bundled ACK handling."""
@@ -2010,7 +2067,10 @@ class TestProcessRawPacketIntegration:
raw = b"\x11\x00" + b"\xee" * 30
with patch("app.packet_processor.broadcast_event", mock_broadcast):
with patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement", return_value=advert):
with (
patch("app.packet_processor.parse_advertisement", return_value=advert),
patch("app.packet_processor.verify_advert_signature", return_value=True),
):
# First arrival: long path
with patch("app.packet_processor.parse_packet", return_value=long_path_info):
await process_raw_packet(raw, timestamp=5000)