9 out of 10 "security" issues we received are the same: logged in as an administrator, you can insert HTML (thus loading remote javascript) in a photo title/description.
This is not a security issue. I have been repeating it for years. Nevertheless, students in software security don't seem to accept that and keep posting about this "security issue" (which is not one).
Let's deactivate $conf['allow_html_descriptions']by default and we should get less of these "security reports" and focus on the real ones, when they're discovered.
I know it's going to be a problem for FCK Editor or Editor Plus users.
See #1936 or #1829 or #1148 (but so many more, every new week)
9 out of 10 "security" issues we received are the same: logged in as an administrator, you can insert HTML (thus loading remote javascript) in a photo title/description.
This is not a security issue. I have been repeating it for years. Nevertheless, students in software security don't seem to accept that and keep posting about this "security issue" (which is not one).
Let's deactivate `$conf['allow_html_descriptions']`by default and we should get less of these "security reports" and focus on the real ones, when they're discovered.
I know it's going to be a problem for FCK Editor or Editor Plus users.
See #1936 or #1829 or #1148 (but so many more, every new week)
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I found a cool use for HTML in descriptions; in this gallery, I have links to highscore/leaderboards, with HTML to open in new tabs (notes).
I'd be somewhat concerned about random users on my instance being able to use HTML freely like that, but I think it'd be good op-sec practice to require users to learn about this topic and disable the HTML themselves.
I found a cool use for HTML in descriptions; [in this gallery](https://media.realmofespionage.xyz/index/category/4), I have links to highscore/leaderboards, with HTML to open in new tabs ([notes](https://wiki.realmofespionage.xyz/servers;windows;nginx;piwigo#old_school_runescape)).
I'd be somewhat concerned about random users on my instance being able to use HTML freely like that, but I think it'd be good op-sec practice to require users to learn about this topic and disable the HTML themselves.
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FCK Editor or Editor Plus users can handle it, displaying a warning message with a link to activate it, then the plugin change that conf itself
FCK Editor or Editor Plus users can handle it, displaying a warning message with a link to activate it, then the plugin change that conf itself
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I'd be somewhat concerned about random users on my instance being able to use HTML freely like that
Who said any random user could inject some HTML on your pages? I didn't :-) Only administrators can do that. That's the whole point of the "issue". Newbie hackers consider that being able to insert HTML as an administrator is a serious security issue. I don't. But they come over and over saying it's a security issue and when I say it's not a security issue, they say Piwigo don't consider security as a serious matter and communicate about it. We don't have the ressources to fight against this low level of understanding (or maybe that's me who don't understand the real problem) so a simple way to "fix" this issue is to block HTML by default.
> I'd be somewhat concerned about random users on my instance being able to use HTML freely like that
Who said any random user could inject some HTML on your pages? I didn't :-) Only administrators can do that. That's the whole point of the "issue". Newbie hackers consider that being able to insert HTML as an administrator is a serious security issue. I don't. But they come over and over saying it's a security issue and when I say it's not a security issue, they say Piwigo don't consider security as a serious matter and communicate about it. We don't have the ressources to fight against this low level of understanding (or maybe that's me who don't understand the real problem) so a simple way to "fix" this issue is to block HTML by default.
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Blocking a user prevents them from interacting with repositories, such as opening or commenting on pull requests or issues. Learn more about blocking a user.
9 out of 10 "security" issues we received are the same: logged in as an administrator, you can insert HTML (thus loading remote javascript) in a photo title/description.
This is not a security issue. I have been repeating it for years. Nevertheless, students in software security don't seem to accept that and keep posting about this "security issue" (which is not one).
Let's deactivate
$conf['allow_html_descriptions']by default and we should get less of these "security reports" and focus on the real ones, when they're discovered.I know it's going to be a problem for FCK Editor or Editor Plus users.
See #1936 or #1829 or #1148 (but so many more, every new week)
What about using https://github.com/ezyang/htmlpurifier ? cc @LintyDev
I found a cool use for HTML in descriptions; in this gallery, I have links to highscore/leaderboards, with HTML to open in new tabs (notes).
I'd be somewhat concerned about random users on my instance being able to use HTML freely like that, but I think it'd be good op-sec practice to require users to learn about this topic and disable the HTML themselves.
FCK Editor or Editor Plus users can handle it, displaying a warning message with a link to activate it, then the plugin change that conf itself
Who said any random user could inject some HTML on your pages? I didn't :-) Only administrators can do that. That's the whole point of the "issue". Newbie hackers consider that being able to insert HTML as an administrator is a serious security issue. I don't. But they come over and over saying it's a security issue and when I say it's not a security issue, they say Piwigo don't consider security as a serious matter and communicate about it. We don't have the ressources to fight against this low level of understanding (or maybe that's me who don't understand the real problem) so a simple way to "fix" this issue is to block HTML by default.