make allow_html_descriptions false by default #1986

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opened 2026-10-05 01:03:11 +02:00 by adam · 4 comments
Owner

9 out of 10 "security" issues we received are the same: logged in as an administrator, you can insert HTML (thus loading remote javascript) in a photo title/description.

This is not a security issue. I have been repeating it for years. Nevertheless, students in software security don't seem to accept that and keep posting about this "security issue" (which is not one).

Let's deactivate $conf['allow_html_descriptions']by default and we should get less of these "security reports" and focus on the real ones, when they're discovered.

I know it's going to be a problem for FCK Editor or Editor Plus users.

See #1936 or #1829 or #1148 (but so many more, every new week)

9 out of 10 "security" issues we received are the same: logged in as an administrator, you can insert HTML (thus loading remote javascript) in a photo title/description. This is not a security issue. I have been repeating it for years. Nevertheless, students in software security don't seem to accept that and keep posting about this "security issue" (which is not one). Let's deactivate `$conf['allow_html_descriptions']`by default and we should get less of these "security reports" and focus on the real ones, when they're discovered. I know it's going to be a problem for FCK Editor or Editor Plus users. See #1936 or #1829 or #1148 (but so many more, every new week) <!-- github-sync-id:2698193991 -->
Author
Owner

What about using https://github.com/ezyang/htmlpurifier ? cc @LintyDev

What about using https://github.com/ezyang/htmlpurifier ? cc @LintyDev <!-- github-comment-id:2563087878 -->
Author
Owner

I found a cool use for HTML in descriptions; in this gallery, I have links to highscore/leaderboards, with HTML to open in new tabs (notes).

I'd be somewhat concerned about random users on my instance being able to use HTML freely like that, but I think it'd be good op-sec practice to require users to learn about this topic and disable the HTML themselves.

I found a cool use for HTML in descriptions; [in this gallery](https://media.realmofespionage.xyz/index/category/4), I have links to highscore/leaderboards, with HTML to open in new tabs ([notes](https://wiki.realmofespionage.xyz/servers;windows;nginx;piwigo#old_school_runescape)). I'd be somewhat concerned about random users on my instance being able to use HTML freely like that, but I think it'd be good op-sec practice to require users to learn about this topic and disable the HTML themselves. <!-- github-comment-id:2600276101 -->
Author
Owner

FCK Editor or Editor Plus users can handle it, displaying a warning message with a link to activate it, then the plugin change that conf itself

FCK Editor or Editor Plus users can handle it, displaying a warning message with a link to activate it, then the plugin change that conf itself <!-- github-comment-id:2600280346 -->
Author
Owner

I'd be somewhat concerned about random users on my instance being able to use HTML freely like that

Who said any random user could inject some HTML on your pages? I didn't :-) Only administrators can do that. That's the whole point of the "issue". Newbie hackers consider that being able to insert HTML as an administrator is a serious security issue. I don't. But they come over and over saying it's a security issue and when I say it's not a security issue, they say Piwigo don't consider security as a serious matter and communicate about it. We don't have the ressources to fight against this low level of understanding (or maybe that's me who don't understand the real problem) so a simple way to "fix" this issue is to block HTML by default.

> I'd be somewhat concerned about random users on my instance being able to use HTML freely like that Who said any random user could inject some HTML on your pages? I didn't :-) Only administrators can do that. That's the whole point of the "issue". Newbie hackers consider that being able to insert HTML as an administrator is a serious security issue. I don't. But they come over and over saying it's a security issue and when I say it's not a security issue, they say Piwigo don't consider security as a serious matter and communicate about it. We don't have the ressources to fight against this low level of understanding (or maybe that's me who don't understand the real problem) so a simple way to "fix" this issue is to block HTML by default. <!-- github-comment-id:2601012387 -->
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Reference: adam/Piwigo#1986