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Fix a low impact directory traversal bug
A common pattern for checking directories in ZNC is the following: sAbsolutePath = CDir::ChangeDir(sAllowedPath, sFile); if (sAbsolutePath.Left(sAllowedPath.length()) != sAllowedPath) Error; But there is a problem: If sAllowedPath doesn't end with a slash, we are vulnerable to an attack. If e.g. sAllowedPath = "/foo/bar", then sFile = "../bartender" would result in sAbsolutePath = "/foo/bartender". Since this path does begin with sAllowedPath, the code allowed it. There shouldn't be any places where this can be exploited currently, but it is still a security bug (path traversal). git-svn-id: https://znc.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/znc/trunk@1569 726aef4b-f618-498e-8847-2d620e286838
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@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ CString CTemplate::ExpandFile(const CString& sFilename) {
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CString sFilePath(CDir::ChangeDir(sRoot, sFile));
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if (CFile::Exists(sFilePath)) {
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// This only works if sRoot got a trailing slash! The
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// code which adds paths makes sure this is true.
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if (sRoot.empty() || sFilePath.Left(sRoot.length()) == sRoot) {
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//DEBUG("\t\tFound [" + sFilePath + "]\n");
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return sFilePath;
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