Firmware keeps its ACL in /s_contacts, so a key provisioned over serial with
`setperm <pubkey> 3` logs in with a blank password forever after. Ours was
RAM-only and setperm was a stub, so that workflow could not work.
- New acl_entries table, keyed by the local identity's full 32-byte public
key rather than its 1-byte hash, which collides between identities. An
identity_label ("repeater", "room_server:<name>") lets an identity adopt
its rows after a key change, as firmware's ACL survives a new private key.
Shared secrets are derived on load, never stored.
- The repeater stores every entry with permissions, a room server admins
only (firmware saveFilter). A write happens only when an entry's stored
permissions change, so a returning admin costs no I/O.
- setperm follows ClientACL::applyPermissions and firmware's replies: atoi
permissions stored as the whole byte, a guest role deletes by key prefix,
other roles need the full key. It refuses an empty prefix and a key that
is not a valid ed25519 point, both of which firmware accepts.
- `get acl` works from the web CLI (the serial stand-in, passed local=True)
and still errors remotely. It was unreachable: "get " matched it first.
- A full table evicts the least active non-admin, as firmware putClient,
instead of refusing; it still refuses when every entry is an admin.
- Room servers keep a stored admin through inactivity eviction and do not
push to entries that have not logged in since load, as firmware skips
clients with no activity.
- Deleting a room server drops its stored entries.