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MarekWoandClaude Opus 5
be0929a3ae
mc-webui has no login, which is fine on a LAN and not fine once the address is handed to testers: they assume the node is theirs and rename it, and the console is right there for anyone curious enough to type into it. MC_DEMO=true refuses everything that reconfigures the radio, destroys data, reaches other people's repeaters, rebuilds the containers, publishes to an external broker, or hands out a secret. Reading and sending messages keep working, so the instance is still worth visiting. The guard is default-deny: an api_bp.before_request hook refuses every non-GET unless it is on a short allowlist, so an endpoint added later is locked without touching this module. That mattered — six mutating endpoints already had no frontend caller and would never have made a hand-written blacklist. A small read denylist covers the GETs that leak (repeater passwords, backup download, capture download, /api/logs), which the write guard never sees. Two paths bypass the HTTP layer and are closed separately: the console is a Socket.IO event, not a route, so it is checked against a read-only command set; the log viewer is refused at the connect handshake. Access is kept two ways. MC_DEMO_TRUSTED_NETS unlocks by CIDR, and MC_DEMO_UNLOCK_CODE unlocks by a code typed once in Settings and held in an HMAC cookie for 30 days — stateless, and deliberately not Flask's session, whose SECRET_KEY is a hardcoded public constant. The trap the network list walks into: published through a tunnel, every visitor arrives from the tunnel's address, and if the tunnel runs on the LAN then trusting the LAN unlocks the instance for the whole internet. An address arriving with a proxy header is therefore not matched unless MC_TRUST_PROXY is on, and startup logs report the resulting shape. Frontend is advisory only: demo-lock.js loads from _head_i18n.html so it reaches all eight entry points including the six iframes, greys out [data-demo-lock] rather than hiding it (the instance exists to show the app off), re-applies via MutationObserver for JS-rendered buttons, and turns any 403 demo_locked into a toast. Verified on the local container: the rename, reboot, updater, vacuum, cleanup and the leaky GETs all 403; sending, read markers and ordinary reads pass; `set name` is refused over the console socket while `infos` still answers; unlock/lock round-trips. 86 new unit tests, en/pl at 100%. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
76 lines
2.8 KiB
YAML
76 lines
2.8 KiB
YAML
# mc-webui v2 — single container with direct device access
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services:
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mc-webui:
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build: .
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container_name: mc-webui
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restart: unless-stopped
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# MC_BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 keeps the plain-HTTP port off the network once
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# HTTPS is up (docs/https-setup.md). Default 0.0.0.0 = reachable as before.
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ports:
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- "${MC_BIND_ADDRESS:-0.0.0.0}:${FLASK_PORT:-5000}:${FLASK_PORT:-5000}"
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# Grant access to serial devices for auto-detection
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# Major 188 = ttyUSB (CP2102, CH340), Major 166 = ttyACM (ESP32-S3)
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device_cgroup_rules:
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- 'c 188:* rmw'
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- 'c 166:* rmw'
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# NET_ADMIN + NET_RAW for BLE scanning (no overhead when BLE unused)
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cap_add:
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- NET_ADMIN
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- NET_RAW
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volumes:
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- "${MC_CONFIG_DIR:-./data}:/data:rw"
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- "/dev:/dev"
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- "/var/run/dbus:/var/run/dbus" # BlueZ D-Bus (for BLE)
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environment:
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- MC_SERIAL_PORT=${MC_SERIAL_PORT:-auto}
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- MC_DEVICE_NAME=${MC_DEVICE_NAME:-MeshCore}
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- MC_CONFIG_DIR=/data
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- MC_TCP_HOST=${MC_TCP_HOST:-}
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- MC_TCP_PORT=${MC_TCP_PORT:-5555}
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- MC_BLE_ADDRESS=${MC_BLE_ADDRESS:-}
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- MC_BACKUP_ENABLED=${MC_BACKUP_ENABLED:-true}
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- MC_BACKUP_HOUR=${MC_BACKUP_HOUR:-2}
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- MC_BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS=${MC_BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS:-7}
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- FLASK_HOST=${FLASK_HOST:-0.0.0.0}
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- FLASK_PORT=${FLASK_PORT:-5000}
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- FLASK_DEBUG=${FLASK_DEBUG:-false}
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- MC_TRUST_PROXY=${MC_TRUST_PROXY:-false}
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- MC_DEMO=${MC_DEMO:-false}
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- MC_DEMO_TRUSTED_NETS=${MC_DEMO_TRUSTED_NETS:-}
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- MC_DEMO_UNLOCK_CODE=${MC_DEMO_UNLOCK_CODE:-}
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- TZ=${TZ:-UTC}
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env_file:
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- path: .env
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required: false
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:5000/health"]
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interval: 30s
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timeout: 10s
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retries: 3
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start_period: 15s
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# Optional HTTPS front end — Nginx Proxy Manager.
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# Inert unless the "https" profile is active, so existing installs are untouched.
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# Enable it by putting COMPOSE_PROFILES=https in .env, then run the usual
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# `docker compose up -d --build` (or mcupdate). Full guide: docs/https-setup.md
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#
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# Both services share this project's default network, so the proxy reaches the
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# app at http://mc-webui:5000 without the app publishing any port at all.
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npm:
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image: ${NPM_IMAGE:-jc21/nginx-proxy-manager:latest}
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container_name: mc-webui-proxy
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profiles: ["https"]
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restart: unless-stopped
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depends_on:
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- mc-webui
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ports:
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- "${NPM_HTTP_PORT:-80}:80" # HTTP — also the Let's Encrypt HTTP-01 challenge
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- "${NPM_HTTPS_PORT:-443}:443" # HTTPS
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- "${NPM_ADMIN_PORT:-81}:81" # Proxy Manager admin UI
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volumes:
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- "${NPM_DATA_DIR:-./data/npm}:/data"
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- "${NPM_LETSENCRYPT_DIR:-./data/letsencrypt}:/etc/letsencrypt"
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environment:
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- TZ=${TZ:-UTC}
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- DISABLE_IPV6=${NPM_DISABLE_IPV6:-true}
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